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REDEMPTIONS AND PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS UNDER
THE 1954 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: THE DIVIDEND
EQUIVALENCE TEST
The enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was the occasion
for a thorough re-examination of the statutory treatment of corporate dis-
tributions. Nevertheless, as the Code finally emerged from Congress, the
law in this area contained the same basic concepts and was expressed in a
statutory framework similar to that of the 1939 Code. However, new
provisions were inserted and others were revised in an attempt to provide
greater certainty in this complex field of taxation.
The statutory scheme defines dividends as the distribution of earnings
and profits of the corporation and taxes them as ordinary income to the
shareholder; on the other hand, amounts which a shareholder receives from
the sale of corporate stock to a third person are treated as payment in ex-
change for a capital asset and are taxed as capital gain or loss. One of the
most perplexing of those situations which fall in between these two extremes
occurs when a shareholder surrenders some of his stock to the corporation
and in return receives a distribution of money or property which may be
attributable entirely to corporate earnings and profits. The difficult problem
is to determine which of these transactions more closely resemble the dis-
tribution of a dividend and therefore should be taxed as ordinary income,
and which are closer to a sale of corporate stock and thus should receive
capital gain or loss treatment. The 1939 Code gave little guidance as to the
proper classification of various situations; it merely specified that if a dis-
tribution in redemption of stock was essentially equivalent to a dividend it
was to be taxed as ordinary income. As a consequence, a wide area was
left to judicial and administrative discretion with resulting uncertainties
to taxpayers. Although the 1954 Code continues the dividend equivalence
test employed under prior law, it also contains new provisions which are
intended to make the statutory indicia more definite and thus to provide
greater certainty.
Since the new Code utilizes a test familiar under the prior law, the
statutory scheme of the 1939 Code and the judicial pronouncements under
it will first be examined. The applicable portions of the 1954 Code will
then be described, and, finally, an analysis of these provisions and their
relationship with the reorganization sections will be undertaken through
the medium of a series of hypothetical problems.
THE 1939 CoDE
The Statutory Scheme
The provisions of the 1939 Code relating to corporate distributions in
redemption of stock were comparatively brief. Section 115(a) provided
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that any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders out of its
earnings and profits of the current taxable year or accumulated since Feb-
ruary 28, 1913, constituted a dividend,' and therefore it was taxable as
ordinary income.2 One exception to this general provision was Section
115(c) which specified that amounts distributed in partial liquidation were
to be treated as in exchange for stock and thus taxed as a capital trans-
action.8 The term "partial liquidation" was defined in Section 115(i) as
".. . a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemp-
tion of a part of its stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete
cancellation or redemption of all or a part of its stock." 4  However, Sec-
tion 115(g) provided that,-if the cancellation or redemption was "at such
time and in such manner as to make . . . [it] essentially equivalent to
the distribution of a taxable dividend," it was to be treated as a dividend.5
This section was a frequent source of litigation, because of the general lan-
guage in which it was couched and because it imposed a severe limitation on
the operation of Section 115(c).
Judicial Interpretation of Section 115(g) 6
The dividend equivalence test of Section 115(g) gave little indication
to the courts of the proper standards to apply in determining which cor-
porate distributions in redemption of stock should be accorded capital treat-
ment, and therefore they were forced to develop their own criteria. The
large variety of factual situations which were litigated resulted in a lack
of uniformity as to what the proper criteria should be. A number of deci-
sions seem to have been based on the presence of one or a few factors,7 but
a majority of the cases, particularly the more recent ones, have indicated
that the "net effect" of a multitude of factors is determinative.
8
1. int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(a), as amended, 61 STAT. 179 (1947).
2. Section 22(a) defined gross income as including dividends. Id. §22(a), as
amended, 53 STAT. 9 (1939) (now INT. REv. CoDE o" 1954, §61(a)(7)).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §115(c), 52 STAT. 496 (1938).
4. Id. §115(i), 52 STAT. 498 (1938).
5. Id. § 115(g) (1), as amended, 64 STAT. 931-32 (1950). The general provision
contained herein will be referred to in the text by its more familiar appellation of
115(g). The balance of the section as it stood in the old Code was added by the
1950 Revenue Act (Revenue Act of 1950, §§208(a), 209(a), 64 STAT. 931-32) and
contained provisions relating to redemptions through the use of a subsidiary corpora-
tion and redemptions to pay death taxes. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(g) (2), 64
STAT. 932. (1950) (now INT. Rm. CODE OF 1954, §303); id. §115(g)(3), as
amended, 65 STAT. 498 (1951) (now INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 304).
For a discussion of the history of § 115(g), see Darrell, Corporate Liquidations
and the Federal Income Tax, 89 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 907, 912-913 (1941); Murphy,
Partial Liquidations and the New Look, 5 TAx L. REv. 73, 75-76 (1950).
6. See generally Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income
Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437, 465 (1950).
7. E.g., Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F,2d 156 (2d Cir. 1935); Rosemary
C. Weir Trust, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. 52199; Carter Tiffany, 16 T.C. 1443
(1951) nomacq., 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 6; A. E. Levit, 43 B.T.A. 1077 (1941); J.
Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937); George A. Lembcke, 33 B.T.A. 700 (1935), nwtacq.,
XV-I Cum. BuLL. 37 (1936).
8. E.g., Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Keefe v. Cote,
213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954); Boyle v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.),
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In concluding that a distribution was essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend, the courts seemed to emphasize the following factors: the distribution
was made pro rata among the shareholders,9 the stock which was redeemed
had been issued as a dividend shortly before the redemption,10 the cor-
poration had paid no dividends or few dividends in the past," there had
been a large surplus for a number of years prior to the distribution, 2 and
the distribution was instigated by the shareholders.3a
The cases in which the distribution was held to be not essentially
equivalent to a dividend seemed to stress the following reasons: few of the
factors mentioned above were present,14 the distribution was dispropor-
tionate among the shareholders, 15 the redemption terminated the taxpayer's
interest in the corporation,-' the stock was redeemed at a price equal to its
book value,17 and there was a legitimate business reason for making the
distribution."' The courts seemed to place more emphasis on the presence
of a valid business reason than on any other single factor. A valid business
purpose was found in cases in which the redemption resulted from a
legitimate contraction of the corporate business,' 9 from the instigation of
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951); Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F2d 819 (7th Cir.
1949) ; Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Estate of Charles
D. Chandler, 22 T.C. 1158 (1954) ; A. C. Monk, P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1147247.
9. Boyle v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817
(1951) ; Rheinstrom v. Conner, 125 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Flanagan v. Helvering,
116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
10. Arthur M. Godwin, 34 B.T.A. 485 (1936), acq., XV-2 Cum. BuLL. 10
(1936); James D. Robinson, 27 B.T.A. 1018, aff'd, 69 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1934).
11. Fostoria Glass Co. v. Yoke, 45 F. Supp. 962 (N.D.W. Va. 1942); Boyle v.
Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951). See also
Meyer v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 165 (1945), renanded, 154 F.2d 55 (3d Cir.), on
remand, 7 T.C. 1381 (1946).
12. E.g., Rheinstrom v. Conner, 125 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1942); G.C.M. 11304,
XII-1 Cum. BuLL. 135 (1933); cf. Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq., 1949-1
Cum. BuLtx 2.
13. E.g., A. E. Levit, 43 B.T.A. 1077 (1941).
14. E.g., Estate of Ira F. Searle, P-H 1950 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 50261; A. C.
Monk, P-H 1950 TC Mem. Dec. 147247; Favrot v. Scofield, 53-1 U.S.T.C. 9427
(W.D. Tex. 1953); Heber Scowcroft Investment Co. v. Commissioner, P-H 1945
T.C. Mem. Dec. 145235; Bona Allen, Jr., 41 B.T.A. 206 (1940); Harry A. Koch,
26 B.T.A. 1025 (1932).
15. E.g., R. W. Creech, 46 B.T.A. 93 (1942), acq., 1942-1 Cum. BuLL 4; Rose-
mary C. Weir Trust, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 52199.
16. Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Carter Tiffany, 16 T.C.
1443, (1951), nonacq., 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 6; cf. Clara Louise Flinn, 37 B.T.A. 1085
(1938), acq., 1938-2 Cum. BuLL. 11. But cf. Hirsch v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 24
(9th Cir. 1941).
17. E.g., A. C. Monk, P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1147247.
18. See cases cited in notes 19-21 infra.
19. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v.
Champion, 78 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1935) ; Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 571 (1934); Estate of Charles D. Chandler, 22 T.C.
1158 (1954); Clarence R. O'Brion, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 51373; Joseph W.
Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. BuuL. 2; L. M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436
(1947); Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. Buu. 7; Heber
Scowcroft Investment Co., P-H 1945 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1145235.
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a creditor of the corporation,2° and from the desire to have stock available
for sale to employees. 2'
A typical example of the "net-effect" approach can be seen in the case
of A. C. Monk 2 in which the Tax Court said:
"No one element is of conclusive importance but the confluence
of all these factors in a single situation plus the regular distribution of
cash dividends of 15% to 50%; the considerable though not drastic
reduction of the petitioner's proportionate stock interest which will
reflect itself notably in future dividend distributions; the origin of the
initiative for the redemption in the creditor banks and the reluctance
of petitioner to agree to it; the importance to the corporation of the
result achieved; the payment for the stock at book value, which was
greatly in excess of petitioner's cost; the fact that no stock dividend
had ever been distributed by the corporation; the prior history of peti-
tioner's repayment in cash in each year of loans obtained from the cor-
poration; plus the peculiar and compelling background of this case,
all seem to place it well beyond the intended orbit of section 115 (g)." 2
At least one court has correctly recognized that the use of the term "net
effect" to cover this treatment is in actuality merely a restatement of the
phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend." 
24
One conclusion which is evident in reviewing the numerous decisions
under Section 115(g) is that the courts applied no definite, uniform tests
in ascertaining which redemptions were essentially equivalent to a dividend
and which were not. Although many of the cases emphasized that the
basic criterion was the net effect of the redemption, rather than the intent
of the shareholders or the corporation,2 the various factors examined in
determining the net effect indicate that the reason or motive for making the
distribution was, in reality, considered to be of primary importance.
26
THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF THE 1954 CODE
In the 1954 Code, Section 301 is the basic provision dealing with dis-
tributions of property from a corporation to a shareholder with respect to
its stock. This section states that, except as otherwise provided, the por-
tion of such a distribution which is a dividend shall be included in gross
income and the portion which is not a dividend shall first be applied against
and reduce the basis of the stock and then the remainder shall be treated
20. Bona Allen, Jr., 41 B.T.A. 206 (1940); Isaac C. Eberly, P-H 1951 T.C.
Mere. Dec. ][51351; A. C. Monk, P-H 1947 T.C. Mern. Dec. 47247; William W.
Wood, 3d., P-H 1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. [43488.
21. H. F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. 878 (1937), acq., 1938-1 Cum. BUIL. 12; Com-
missioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949).
22. P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. 147247.
23. Id. at pp. 1020-21.
24. Commisioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 1954). See Commis-
sioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949).
25. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
26. See Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir. 1954).
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as gain from the sale or exchange of property.27  As under the 1939 Code,
a dividend is defined in Section 316(a) as any distribution of property by
a corporation to its shareholders out of its earnings and profits of the
taxable year or out of its earnings and profits accumulated since February
28, 1913. This provision also specifies that, except as otherwise provided,
every distribution is made out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof.
Therefore, the effect of the 1954 Code is similar to that of the prior law,
because, unless there is a specific provision to the contrary, every distribu-
tion from a corporation to its shareholders will be considered a dividend
and thus will be taxed as ordinary income so long as the corporation has
either current or accumulated earnings and profits. As under the 1939
Code, certain distributions in redemption of stock constitute an exception
to this general treatment and are taxed as capital transactions, despite the
presence of earnings and profits.28 However, the new Code has made a
basic change by splitting those distributions which formerly were covered
by the old Sections 115 (c) and 115(g) into two parts-one providing for
distributions in redemption of stock 29 and the other providing for dis-
tributions in partial liquidation of the corporation. 0 Apparently, the dis-
tinction to be drawn is that qualification under the former is determined
solely by the effect of the distribution on the shareholders, while qualifica-
tion under the latter is determined solely by the effect of the distribution on
the corporation.8 '
Redemptions
A redemption of stock is defined in Section 317(b) as an acquisition
by a corporation of its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property,
whether or not the stock is cancelled, retired or held as treasury stock.
8 2
Amounts received in redemption of stock are taxed as capital gain or loss
by Section 302(a) if the redemption qualifies under one of the four condi-
27. INT. Ray. CoDE oF 1954, § 301 (a), (c).
28. Id. §§ 302, 346.
29. Id. § 302.
30. Id. § 346.
31. See text at notes 54-55 infra.
32. Apparently, the purpose of this latter phrase was to overrule the cases under
prior law which held that, if the corporation placed the acquired stock in its
treasury, there was a "sale" of stock to the corporation rather than a redemption.
See SEN. RE,. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1954) (hereinafter cited SEN.
REP.).
A characterizing of corporate acquisitions of its own stock as a "sale' may have
arisen as a judicial amelioration of the treatment of distributions in partial liquida-
tion as short term capital gain in the Revenue Acts between 1934 and 1942. See
Bittker & Redlich, supra note 6, at 451. For a general description of the tax
treatment of partial liquidations during the 1934-1942 period see 1 MaRaENs, FEDEAL
INc m TAXATION § 9.122 (Cum. Supp. 1954) ; Bittker & Redlich, supra note 6, at
.458-59. See Estate of Charles C. Ingalls, 45 B.T.A. 787 (1941), iwnzocq., 1942-1
Cum. BuLL. 21, aff'd, 132 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1943). Holding a redemption
was actually a sale meant that the amount received would be treated as a long term
capital gain. See, e.g., Alpers v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1942); R. W.
Creech, 46 B.T.A. 93 (1942), acq., 1942-1 Cum. BULL. 4; W. C. Robinson, 42 B.T.A.
725 (1940); William A. Smith, 38 B.T.A. 317 (1940); cf. Commissioner v. Suite,
177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949) (applying the law after 1942).
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tions set forth in Section 302(b). Three of these are specific examples 8
and the fourth,3 4 which is derived from the old Section 115 (g), states that
the redemption must not be essentially equivalent to a dividend.
The first of the specific examples provides that the distribution must
be "substantially disproportionate," 3 5 and this phrase is carefully defined
to mean that the redemption must result in a specified decrease in the share-
holder's ownership of both voting stock and common stock. It is pro-
vided that immediately after the redemption the ratio which the voting stock
owned by the shareholder bears to all of the voting stock of the corpora-
tion must be less than 80 percent of the same ratio before the redemption,36
and this same test must be met with respect to the shareholder's common
stock.37 As a further limitation, it is provided that after the redemption
the shareholder cannot own 50 percent or more of all of the classes of voting
stock 8 To insure against the possibility of taxpayer abuse, it is also
specified that a substantially disproportionate redemption will not qualify
under this test if it is one of a series of redemptions which in the aggregate
will not result in a substantially disproportionate redemption.3 9 In order
for a distribution to qualify under the second specific example, the share-
holder's interest in the corporation must be terminated by a redemption of
all of his stock.-° The third example is a technical provision of limited
application, since it is concerned with redemptions of stock by railroads
pursuant to a plan of reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act.4 '
All four tests of Section 302(b) are subject to the new and important
provisions of Section 318 respecting attribution of ownership of stock.2
Essentially under this section, a taxpayer is considered as owning stock
held by his spouse, children, grandchildren and parents, and by partner-
ships, estates, trusts and corporations in which he has a specified interest.
33. See text at and following note 35 infra.
34. INT. R1xv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (1). See text at and following note 56
infra.
35. Id. §302(b) (2) (A).
36. Id. § 302(b) (2) (C).
37. Ibid.
38. Id. § 302(b) (2) (B). The Senate Finance Committee describes this as a
"further safeguard." SEN. REP. 45.
39. INT. Ray. CODE oF 1954, § 302(b) (2) (D). See Boyle v. Commissioner, 187
F.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951).
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (3).
41. Id. §302(b) (4).
42. Id. §302(c) (1). See U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.302-1, 19 Fm. RG.
8239 (1954). But compare Cohen, Redemptions of Stock Under The Internal
Revente Code of 1954, 103 U. oF PA. L. REv. 739, 758-59 (1955).
The rules of attribution of ownership of stock are new in the 1954 Code; how-
ever, the Treasury did attempt to introduce the concept into the old Code by a pro-
posed amendment to the regulations under § 115(g). See U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg.,
16 FED. RE. 10312 (1951). But cf. Estate of Ira F. Searle, P-H 1950 T.C. Mem.
Dec. [ 50261. Similar rules were applied under the 1939 Code to collapsible cor-
porations (U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.117(m)-1(c)(2)(1953)) and in determining
whether a corporation was a personal holding company (Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§503, 52 STAT. 559 (1938)).
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The theory for introducing these provisions into the Code seems to be that,
although normally a shareholder's equity interest in a corporation may be
basically changed by a redemption of some of his stock, in reality it may not
be basically changed where closely related interests continue to hold stock
in the corporation.4 One exception to the family 44 attribution rules is
made where a shareholder wishes to terminate his interest in the corpora-
tion while permitting other members of his family to continue to own stock
in it. Section 302(c) (2) provides that in such a case a redemption of
the shareholder's stock will qualify under Section 302(a) if the following
conditions are met: (1) after the redemption the, shareholder has no inter-
est in the corporation other than as a creditor, (2) he does not acquire an
interest other than by inheritance for ten years thereafter, (3) he had not
acquired within the ten-year period prior to the redemption stock from a
person whose stock would be attributed to him in a transaction having tax
avoidance as a principal purpose, (4) such a person had not acquired stock
from the shareholder within the same period in a transaction having tax
avoidance as a principal purpose, and (5) he complies with the regulations
prescribed by the Secretary.
Partial Liquidations
Section 331 (a) (2) of the new Code specifies that distributions in
partial liquidation are to receive capital gain or loss treatment, and Section
346 defines partial liquidations. The pattern of Section 346 is similar to
Section 302 in that there is a general standard 5 followed by a specific
example. 46 The general standard again draws on the dividend equivalence
test of Section 115(g) of the 1939 Code. A distribution in redemption 47
of part of the stock of a corporation qualifies as a partial liquidation if it is
not "essentially equivalent to a dividend" and it is made pursuant to a plan
and within a prescribed period. There is also, as in the old Code, a provi-
sion that one of a series of distributions in redemption of all of the stock
of the corporation qualifies as a partial liquidation.48 A distribution comes
within the specific example if all of the following conditions are met: (1)
the distribution is attributable to the corporation's ceasing to conduct a
trade or business, or it consists of the assets of a trade or business, (2)
43. See A.L.I. FED. INcoME TAX STAT. 274 (Feb. 1954 Draft). Compare the
theory expressed in Estate of Ira F. Searle, P-H 1950 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1[ 50261.
44. This exception does not apply to the other rules of attribution of owner-
ship of stock. See note 83 infra.
45. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 346 (a) (2). See text following note 66 infra.
46. Id. § 346(b).
47. Although § 346 uses the word "redemption," the definition of this word
in § 317(a) does not by its terms apply to the part of subchapter C which deals
with corporate liquidations. Thus, it is conceivable that the "sale or redemption"
argument (see note 32 supra) could be read into § 346. However, the proposed
regulations seem to assume that the definition applies to all of subchapter C (U.S.
Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.317-2,3,4, 19 FED. REG. 8254 (1954)), and this appears
to be a more reasonable reading of the Code.
48. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §346(a) (1).
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after the distribution, the corporation actively conducts a trade or business,
(3) both trades or businesses were actively conducted throughout the five-
year period prior to the distribution, and (4) neither of the trades or busi-
nesses was acquired within this five-year period in a transaction in which
gain or loss was recognized. In contrast to redemptions under Section 302,
the rules as to constructive ownership of stock are not applied to partial
liquidations.4 9
The Dividend Equivalence Tests of Sections 302 azd 346
Under the House Bill 50 the dividend equivalence standard was elim-
inated, and, in order for a distribution to qualify for capital treatment, it
had to meet the requirements of one of the carefully defined tests which
were set forth in two provisions--one dealing with redemptions and the
other with partial liquidations. The aims of the House Ways and Means
Committee were to make prior law more definite and to prevent tax avoid-
ance devices which had received judicial sanction under the 1939 Code.51
Although the Senate shared these views, it concluded that flexibility should
not be completely sacrificed for legislative certainty. 2 The final result was
that the House approach of setting forth specific examples in separate
statutory provisions was continued but that the preciseness of the House
Bill was destroyed by introducing the broad dividend equivalence test of
the prior code into each section.
3
The Senate Finance Committee Report states that, in interpreting
Section 302, the examination is to be limited to what has occurred on the
shareholder level and that the interpretation of Section 346 is to be con-
ducted solely on the basis of what has taken place on the corporate level.5 4
This seems to be the only logical inference which can be drawn from the
statute itself, because there appears to be no other reason for having divided
those transactions which formerly were covered by Sections 115(c) and
115(g) into two statutory provisions. Moreover, the substantially dis-
proportionate test and the termination of interest test of Section 302 are
directed toward the effect of the distribution on the shareholder, whereas
the two-business example of Section 346 is directed toward certain activi-
ties of the corporation, without regard to the effect on the shareholder.5
In conformity with this approach of the Senate Report, a redemption of
stock under Section 302 would be considered on a shareholder-by-share-
holder basis, and, therefore, when a corporation redeems the stock of a
number of its shareholders, the distributions to some of them may be taxed
49. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.346-2, 19 FED. REG. 8268 (1954); SEN. REP.
262.
50. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 302, 336(a) (1954).
51. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1954).
52. SEN. REP. 41-42.
53. See Murphy, Dividend Equivalence-The End of the Beginning?, 10 TAx
L. REv. 213 (1955).
54. Sm. REP. 49.
55. Section 346(b) states that whether or not a distribution meets the two-
business test ". . . shall be determined without regard to whether or not the dis-
tribution is pro rata with respect to all of the shareholders of the corporation."
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as a dividend even though the distributions to others are treated as capital
transactions. On the other hand, all of the shareholders who receive a por-
tion of a distribution would be taxed in the same manner if the transaction
is considered under Section 346, since the examination is made solely on
the corporate level.
It is not clear, however, what circumstances are to be examined in
order to determine under Section 302(b) (1) whether or not the effect on
the shareholder is such as to make the distribution essentially equivalent to
a dividend. The Senate Report states that in general the test is to be the
one which was employed under Section 115(g). 56 But this does not pro-
vide an easy solution, since the decisions under the 1939 Code were not
focused solely at the shareholder level or the corporate level, but were
based on a number of factors, some of which had an effect on the share-
holders and some of which had an effect on the corporation. 7 Neverthe-
less, it is apparent that under the prior law one reason for taxing a redemp-
tion as a dividend was that it was made pro rata among the shareholders 5 8
and two reasons for taxing a redemption as a capital transaction were that
it terminated the shareholder's interest in the corporation 59 or that it was
non-pro rata. 60 The Proposed Regulations indicate that ordinarily pro
rata redemptions will not come within the dividend equivalence test of
Section 302.61 Since one of the specific examples provides automatic capital
treatment for a shareholder whose interest in the corporation has been ter-
minated by the redemption B and since the substantially disproportionate
test prescribes the same treatment for one type of non-pro rata redemp-
tion, it would seem that distributions which will qualify under the divi-
dend equivalence standard of Section 302 will be limited almost completely
to certain modifications of these specific examples 4 The Senate Report
also states that "in applying [the test employed under Section l15(g)]
. . . the inquiry will be devoted solely to the question of whether or not
the transaction by its nature may properly be characterized as a sale of
stock by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation." 6 5 Although the
meaning of this statement is in doubt, a possible interpretation is that any
redemption which would otherwise come within the dividend equivalence
test of Section 302 will be taxed as ordinary income if it was not a bona
fide transaction and was undertaken for the purpose of tax avoidance. 68
56. SEN. REP. 234.
57. See text following note 6 supra.
58. See text at note 9 and note 9 supra.
59. See text at note 16 and note 16 .,upra.
60. See text at note 15 and note 15 supra.
61. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.302-2(b), 19 FFD. REG. 8239 (1954). See
the discussion in text following note 145 infra.
62. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §302(b) (3).
63. Id. §302(b) (2).
64. But see text at notes 80-89 infra and text following note 145 infra.
65. SEN. REP. 234.
66. After this phrase, the Report states that in making this determination the
presence or absence of earnings and profits is immaterial. Ibid. However, this
would seem to affect primarily deficit corporations. See Cohen, supra note 42, at
744.
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The Senate was somewhat more precise as to what should be con-
sidered on the corporate level in determining whether a distribution meets
the dividend equivalence test of Section 346. The Finance Committee
Report states that:
"Primarily this definition [of partial liquidation] involves the
concept of 'corporate contraction' as developed under existing law.
. . . It is intended that a genuine contraction of the business as
under present law will result in partial liquidation." 
6 7
Although it is not clear from the cases decided under Section 11 5 (g) what
constitutes a "genuine contraction," 68 there are several statements in the
Statute and Report which indicate the types of situations which may be held
to fall within the meaning of this term. In the first place, Section
346(a) (2) provides that the two-business test of subsection (b) is an
example of a distribution which is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
This indicates that some cases in which there is a contraction resulting from
the liquidation of one of two businesses may qualify under the dividend
equivalence test although they do not meet all of the requirements of the
specific example. Secondly, both the Senate Report 6 9 and the Proposed
Regulations 70 specify that the case of Joseph W. Imler 71 is one example
which will qualify as a genuine contraction and that a distribution of a
reserve for expansion will not qualify. In ascertaining whether or not a
particular set of circumstances constitutes a genuine contraction, the courts
probably will analyze it in light of the factors present in these two types
of situations.
There is no clear indication as to whether the inquiry on the cor-
porate level can extend beyond the question of corporate contraction.
However, the Senate Report states only that the definition of partial liquida-
tion primarily involves the concept of corporate contraction, 72 and the
Proposed Regulations are to the same effect.73 Moreover, the use of the
same general test in Section 346(a) as was employed in the 1939 Code may
prompt the courts to apply the prior case law, particularly the business pur-
pose test,74 to the cases arising under the new Code.
Overlapping Distributions
The final problem to be considered in interpreting the statutory scheme
involves distributions which meet the requirements of one of the specific
examples and also qtialify under the dividend equivalence test and distribu-
67. SEN. R a. 262.
68. See text at notes 121-33 infra.
69. SEN. R-p. 262.
70. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.346-1(a), 19 FEv. REG. 8267 (1954).
71. 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. Buu. 2. See text following note
124 infra.
72. See text at note 67 supra.
73. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.346-1 (a), 19 FED. REG. 8267 (1954).
74. See text at and following note 18 su/pra.
1955]
946 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
tions which come within both Section 302 and Section 346. Any case
which qualifies under the two-business test of Section 346(b) will also
qualify under the dividend equivalence standard of Section 346(a),75 and
there is no advantage to the taxpayer to argue that the distribution falls
under the latter provision, since the result in either case would be the same.
Section 302(b) (5) provides that failure to meet the requirements of any
of the specific examples of Section 302 is not to be taken into account in
considering whether a transaction qualifies under the dividend equivalence
test of Section 302(b)(1).76 If a redemption terminates the taxpayer's
interest in the corporation and also comes within Section 302(b) (1), it is
to the taxpayer's advantage to contend that the redemption should be
treated under the latter provision, because it is not subject to the restriction
as to the acquisition of an interest in the corporation within the ten years
following the redemption.77 If a distribution falls within both Sections
302 and 346, it is to be taxed under the latter provision.78 However, it is
possible for a portion of a distribution to qualify under Section 346 and the
remainder under Section 302.79 But, since the rules of constructive owner-
ship of stock are applicable to Section 302 and not to Section 346, the tax-
payer should maintain in every case in which these rules might apply that
the distribution to him comes within the latter section.
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE 1954 CODE
Although the 1954 Code retains the dividend equivalence standard of
the 1939 Code, it would seem to create certain new problems because of the
separate treatment of redemptions and partial liquidations and because of
the insertion of the specific examples in both Sections 302 and 346. In
order to point out some of these problems, an analysis of the dividend
equivalence test will now be explored through a series of hypothetical cases
which are based primarily on situations that arose under the 1939 Code.
Distributions Under Section 302
Redemptions Not Qualifying under the Specific Examples.-Corpora-
tion X has issued only one class of stock of 100 shares. A owns 50 shares,
A's son owns 25 shares, and the remaining 25 shares are owned by a trust
in which A has a life estate. The trust was set up under the will of A's
former business associate, who was a bachelor, and has been administered
by a trustee who has voted the stock and acted completely independent of A.
A person, unrelated to A, is the remainderman of the trust, and A's life
estate, computed on an actuarial basis, is a 15 percent interest.80 Corpora-
tion X redeems A's 50 shares.
75. See text following note 68 supra.
76. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §302(b) (5).
77. Id. §302(c) (2).
78. Id. § 346(c); U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.346-2, 19 FED. REG. 8268
(1954).
79. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.302-1, 19 FED. REG. 8239 (1954).
80. See U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.318-3(d), 19 FED. REG. 8256 (1954).
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If this case had been decided under the 1939 Code, the redempti6n
would not have been taxed as a dividend, because A would not have been
considered as owning his son's stock or that of the trust,8' and thus the
redemption would have terminated his interest in the corporation. How-
ever, under the 1954 Code the redemption of A's stock cannot qualify under
the termination of interest test of Section 302(b) (3) because of the opera-
tion of the rules attributing ownership of stock. Although Section
302(c) (2) would permit A's interest in the corporation to be terminated
despite his son's continued ownership of stock,82 it does not apply to the
shares owned by the trust; therefore, A still has attributed to him 15 per-
cent of the stock held in trust, or 3.75 shares.83 Moreover, the attribution
of ownership rules prevent this redemption from qualifying under the sub-
stantially disproportionate test of Section 302(b) (2), because Section
302(c) (2) is not applicable to this provision and thus A will be considered
as owning his son's 25 shares as well as 3.75 of the shares held by the
trust. Consequently, although the redemption comes within the 80 per-
cent ratio requirement,8 4 it fails to meet the limitation that A own less than
50 percent of the voting stock following the redemption. 5
Since the redemption to A fails to come within either of the specific
tests, the question arises as to whether it would qualify under the divi-
dend equivalence standard of Section 302(b) (1). A could advance two
arguments that the distribution to him should come within the dividend
equivalence test. First he could point out that the only reason the redemp-
tion fails to qualify as terminating his interest is because of the construc-
tive ownership of 3.75 of the shares held in trust, and that, since he does
not have control over the activities of the trustee, he would not have been
able to force the latter to dispose of the stock held by the trust. Therefore,
it could be maintained that the redemption should qualify as not being
essentially equivalent to a dividend on the basis that A has made a bona
fide attempt to terminate his interest, which was Congress' aim when it
inserted the attribution of ownership provisions. 86  This situation is dis-
81. Cf. Clara Louise Flinn, 37 B.T.A. 1085, 1094 (1938), nonacq., 1938-2 Cum.
BULL. 43. See the reasoning in Estate of Ira F. Searle, P-H 1950 T.C. Mem. Dec.
150261, an extreme application of which can be found in John T. Roberts, 17 T.C.
1415, 1419 (1952), rev/d, 203 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1953). Where the remaining
shareholders were unrelated individuals the termination of a shareholder's interest
under the 1939 Code was considered as falling without the ban of § 115(g). Compare
Carter Tiffany, 16 T.C. 1443 (1951), nwlacq., 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 6, with Boyle v.
Commissioner, 187 F2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951).
82. INT. REV. Com, oF 1954, §302(c) (2).
83. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.302-4(f), 19 FED. REG. 8240 (1954). No rea-
son is given in the Senate Report for limiting the exception to cases of family owner-
ship of stock.
84. Before the redemption A is considered as owning his own 50 shares, his
son's 25 shares and 3.75 shares held by the trust or 78.75% of the stock of Cor-
poration X. Following the redemption A is treated as owning 28.75 shares or
57.54% of the stock. This latter ratio is less than 80% of the previous ratio.
See INT. Rnv. CoDE OF 1954, §302(b) (2) (C).
85. Id. §302(b) (2) (B).
86. See SEN. REP. 45.
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tinguishable from a case in which a second corporation, Corporation Y,
holds the 25 shares and A owns 51 percent of the stock of this second cor-
poration. In such an instance, the constructive ownership rules would
attribute to A 51 percent of the 25 shares in Corporation X.8 The factor
which differentiates this case from the one in which the trust holds the
25 shares is that A, by his control of Corporation Y, can force it to dispose
of the 25 shares held in Corporation X, and thus he has not done all within
his power to terminate his interest in Corporation X. A's second argu-
ment would be that, since the dividend equivalence test was inserted by the
Senate to permit some flexibility because the mathematical precision of the
standards in the House Bill "appeared unnecessarily restrictive," 88 a case
which almost meets the requirements of the termination of interest test
should qualify as not being essentially equivalent to a dividend. The weak-
ness of both of these arguments is that Section 302 sets forth a definite
method by which a shareholder can qualify for capital treatment by ter-
minating his interest in the corporation. When, as in this case, the share-
holder fails to come within this test, it can be maintained that the transac-
tion should be taxed as a dividend or the specific examples will have little
meaning. Furthermore, if the redemption were held to be within the
dividend equivalence test, A would be in a more advantageous position
than if it had come within the termination of interest test, because the
restriction with respect to A's acquiring an interest in Corporation X for
the ten-year period following the redemption applies only to the latter pro-
vision.8 9 Thus, where the Statute specifically allows an exception to the
constructive ownership rules, A would be in a more restricted position than
where it makes no exception.
Basically, this situation presents a dilemma. If the cases which are
close to the specific tests are held to be within the dividend equivalence
standard, the former have little meaning. On the other hand, if these
cases are not treated as within the dividend equivalence test, it has little
meaning; since qualification under Section 302 is limited to an examination
of the effect of the distribution on the shareholder level, the dividend
equivalence test of this section would seem to be limited to cases in which
there is some change in the shareholder's interest in the corporation, and
such cases are, in effect, modifications of the specific examples.9 0 This
dilemma is emphasized in the hypothetical example, because, as was pointed
out above, the taxpayer could avoid the restriction as to acquiring an in-
terest in the corporation by having the distribution to him treated under
the dividend equivalence standard.
The Code suggests a method of avoiding this dilemma. Section
302(b) (5) provides that "in determining whether a redemption meets
the requirements of [the dividend equivalence test] . .. , the fact that it
87. NT. REv. Cons OF 1954, § 318(a) (2) (C).
88. SEN. REP. 44. See text at notes 50-53 supra.
89. INT. REV. CoPS OF 1954, §302(c)(1),(2).
90. See text at notes 62-64 upra.
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fails to meet the requirements of . . . [the specific examples] shall not
be taken into account." 91 The conclusion is that the specific tests are of
little effect, except to give capital treatment to transactions coming exactly
within them and to provide an indication of the proper interpretation to be
placed on the dividend equivalence test. The dilemma, therefore, is merely
avoided but not removed.
Use of Surplus in the Sale of the Corporation.-A and B own the X
Corporation which they wish to sell to C and D. The corporation has a
large earned surplus and possesses a large amount of readily distributable
assets, including cash and Government bonds. Both C and D are unable
to pay for the large surplus and are unwilling to acquire it because of
attendant tax liabilities. Accordingly, C and D purchase 20 percent of
A's and B's stock for an amount equal to the value of the corporation's
operating assets, and A and B agree to have the corporation redeem the
remaining shares of their stock.
This situation is essentially the same as the one presented in Zenz v.
Quinlivan 92 and it raises problems of the proper tax treatment of both
A and B and C and D. It will be considered first from the standpoint of
the sellers and then from that of the buyers. Under the 1939 Code 93 the
redemption of the sellers' stock probably would not have been held to be
equivalent to the distribution of a dividend to them, even though it was pro
rata and there was no business purpose, since it terminated their interests
in the corporation. 94  However, if the situation was reversed and the 80
percent of the stock was first redeemed by the corporation and then the
balance of the stock was sold to C and D, the result under the 1939 Code
was not as clear, there being a much greater possibility that the redemption
would have been subject to tax as a dividend, since it did not terminate the
interests of A and B, it was made pro rata and there was no business pur-
pose.95 The 1954 Code would seem to perpetuate this distinction. Where
the stock is sold first and then the redemption occurs, the transaction would
fit within the termination of interest test of Section 302(b) (3). On the
other hand, if the events occur in the reverse order, it would seem more
probable that the distribution to A and B would be taxed under Section
301. The distribution is made pro rata to A and B and therefore effects no
change on the shareholder level, which would seem to be required for
qualification under the dividend equivalence standard of Section 302 unless
this test encompasses some pro rata redemptions because of the showing of
91. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §302(b) (5).
92. 213 F2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954), acq., Rev. Rul. 458, 1954 INT. RE:V. BnL.
No. 42, at 15.
93. The law under the 1939 Code is discussed in Note, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1387
(1954).
94. Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) ; cf. Carter Tiffany, 16 T.C.
1443 (1951), tnmacq., 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 6.
95. Albert G. Rooks, P-H 1953 T.C. Mem. Dec. 153036; A. D. Clark, P-H
1942 T.C. Mem. Dec. 42433; cf. T. J. Coffey, Jr., 14 T.C. 1410 (1950).
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a valid business purpose.9 6 However, the courts might accept the argu-
ment in the latter case that the distributions to the sellers should be given
capital treatment because the transaction is an integrated one, the ultimate
effect of which is to terminate their interests in the corporation.
9 7
With respect to the buyers, the approach under both the 1939 and
1954 Codes revolves around the question of whether the distributions to
A and B should be considered as ordinary income to C and D. Under the
old Code, if the obligation to acquire the sellers' stock was solely that of
the corporation, the redemption of that stock was not considered as a divi-
dend to the buyers.98 Thus in Ray Edenfield,99 the corporation redeemed
stock from the sellers and issued second mortgage bonds in payment thereof.
The subsequent payments on these bonds by the corporation were held not
to be taxable to the purchasers since the bonds were the obligation of the
corporation and in no sense that of the buyers. A similar result was
reached even where the buyers themselves acquired the stock but were
able to show that they were acting merely as the agents of the corporation
and that the obligation to acquire the stock was actually that of the cor-
poration. 14 If, on the other hand, the buyers were personally obligated by
the purchase agreement to obtain the sellers' interests, a redemption of the
sellers' stock by the corporation was considered as a dividend distribution
to the buyers, on the theory that the corporation discharged the debt owed
by the buyers to the sellers. 0' This distinction based on whether the
acquisition of stock is the obligation of the buyers or of the corporation can
be continued by the courts in interpreting the new Code because there is
nothing in the statutory scheme which would eliminate it.
The effect of these doctrines which were developed under prior law
and which would seem to be perpetuated under the 1954 Code is to permit
the corporation's surplus to be used to accomplish the purchase of the
corporation with no tax on the buyers and with capital treatment to the
sellers. One justification for this is that the same result could be achieved
through a purchase and liquidation. C and D could purchase A's and B's
stock for cash and notes, using the stock acquired as the security for the
notes. C and D then could completely liquidate the corporation and utilize
the proceeds to pay off the notes. In such a situation A and B would be
given capital treatment and presumably there would be no tax on C and D,
since the purchase price of the stock would reflect the total value of the cor-
96. See text following note 145 infra.
97. Compare the approach taken by the district court in Zenz v. Quinlivan, 106
F. Supp. 57, 61 (N.D. Ohio 1952), rezld, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
98. Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952), acq., 1953-1 Cum BuL.. 4; Max Viault,
36 B.T.A. 430 (1937).
99. 19 T.C. 13 (1952), acq., 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 4.
100. Fox v. Harrison, 145 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1944). But ef. Mendle Silverman,
P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 154168; Frank P. Holloway, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem.
Dec. 51359, aff'd, 203 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1953).
101. Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Mendle Silverman,
supra note 100; Frank P. Holloway, supra note 100. See Rev. Rul. 458, 1954 INT.
REv. BuLL. No. 42, at 15.
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poration's assets. 102 However, this plan would require that the business
be operated in the future as a partnership.10 3 If C and D wished to con-
tinue operation in the corporate form, they could organize Corporation Y,
contribute the amount of money to it that they intend to pay for the operat-
ing assets of Corporation X, and receive in return Corporation Y's stock.
Corporation X then could adopt a plan of complete liquidation and sell its
operating assets to Corporation Y for the cash contributed by C and D.104
If Corporation X completely liquidated within one year following the adop-
tion of the plan of liquidation, 0 5 it could distribute all of its remaining
assets, including those attributable to its earnings and profits, to A and B
with no tax on C and D or on the corporation and with A and B receiving
capital gain or loss treatment.10 In both the case of the redemption and the
case of the purchase and liquidation the basic reason for this favorable tax
treatment would seem to be that the sellers are terminating their interests
in the corporation and the buyers own a corporation which does not have
all of the assets it possessed prior to the sale.
Distributions Under Section 346
The dividend equivalence provision in Section 346(a) can best be
interpreted by first examining the two-business test contained in Section
346(b), because the specific test is prescribed by statute to be one example
of a distribution which is within the general provision.
0 7
Two Businesses Held for Five Years.-Although the two-business
partial liquidation described in Section 346(b) is more definite than the
general dividend equivalence test, it does raise certain problems, the
primary one revolving around the question of what constitutes two busi-
nesses. Neither the Statute nor the Proposed Regulations ' 08 is of much
assistance in solving this problem. While one requirement is that the two
102. There is also the possibility of the integrated transaction approach of the
Kimbell-Diamond case (Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 718
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 827 (1951)) being applied to this situation and the
assets received as liquidating distribution would take the same basis as the stock
surrendered. See Cohen, Gelberg, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, Corporate Liquida-
tio ts Under thw Intental Revetue Code of 1954, 55 COL. L. REv. 37, 43 n.32 (1955).
103. A complete liquidation followed by a reincorporation of the operating assets
presents the possibility that the transaction would be treated as a reorganization with
a distribution of "boot" to the shareholders. See Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162
F2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947).
104. See Distributors Finance Corp., 20 T.C. 768 (1953), acq., 1954-1 Cum.
BuLL. 4.
105. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 337. See Cohen, et a!., supra note 102, at
45.
106. However, it should be noted that in these situations the basis of the
operating assets would be changed while in the redemption case it would remain the
same. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 334. Where the new basis would be lower
than the old adjusted basis, the purchase of the corporation by a plan involving a com-
plete liquidation would not be desirable for the buyers.
107. INT. RFv. CoDE oF 1954, §346(a) (2), (b).
108. The Proposed Regulations under § 346 refer to the regulations under § 355.
U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.346-1(c) (2), 19 FED. Ra. 8268 (1954). However, the
latter are of little assistance. See id. § 1.355-4(b) (3), 19 FED. R E. 8279 (1954).
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trades or businesses be actively conducted, 0 9 there is no indication of the
point at which two activities or departments of the same corporation will
be considered sufficiently separate to come within the statutory requirement.
Assume that Corporation X was formed in 1893 to wholesale groceries
and dry goods; in 1912 it began to manufacture dry goods; in 1919 it
undertook certain warehousing operations; in 1926 it started to conduct
a cannery; and in 1932 it began operating some retail outlets. Each of
these operations had different management personnel and each was treated
separately for bookkeeping purposes. By 1955 the corporation had sus-
tained losses in the manufacturing and canning departments; as a result
they were liquidated and the proceeds were distributed to the share-
holders in exchange for some of their stock.110 These two operations, which
primarily involve the production of goods, would seem to be sufficiently
separate from the remainder of the corporation's activities to qualify as
trades or businesses within the meaning of Section 346(b). In addition,
the assets of the liquidated operations are distinguishable from the assets
used in the corporation's other branches.
A case which would be more difficult to fit within Section 346(b) is
one in which a corporation manufactures men's overalls and women's
blouses. The two activities require different machines and separate in-
ventory, but they are conducted in the same building, operated under the
same management personnel, and are treated together for bookkeeping pur-
poses. The corporation pursuant to a plan ceases to manufacture blouses,
disposes of the inventory and machinery connected with this operation, and
distributes the proceeds to its shareholders in return for some of their
stock. As in the case discussed above, the assets which were sold are
distinguishable from the remaining assets of the business. On the other
hand, the fact that the two activities were treated as one business for
management and bookkeeping purposes raises some doubt as to whether
the distribution would come within the specific example. The House
version of this section contained a provision which required that each
business have its own books and personnel,"" and the Senate Committee
Report does not indicate the reason for eliminating this provision. It might
be that the Senate considered these factors to be insignificant, but the more
likely inference is that they were deleted as a result of the general policy of
the Senate to provide greater flexibility. The percentage of the business
which the production of the blouses represented could also have a bearing
on the result. Thus, if it constituted 90 percent of the business, the change
undertaken by the corporation is considerably greater than if it represented
less than 50 percent of the business. The condusion is that it is very
questionable whether this type of situation involves the liquidation of a
109. See SE-. REP. 262. See text at and following note 135 infra.
110. See Heber Scowcroft Investment Co., P-H 1945 T.C. Mem. Dec. 45235.
111. The House Bill specified that books and records for the two businesses
have been kept separately, that they have been operated separately, and that 909
of the gross income have been attributable to other than personal holding company
income. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., § 336(a) (2)-(A),(B),(C) (1954).
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separate trade or business, or whether it merely involves the "dropping of
an old product" or "changing the capacity" of the business.-- 2 This diffi-
culty suggests that in such a situation the taxpayer probably will argue that
the distribution to him comes within both the two-business test and the
general dividend equivalence standard.
The requirement that the two businesses have been actively conducted
for five years prior to the distribution would seem to be a codification of
a business purpose test. Primarily, this provision prevents shareholders
from receiving favorable tax treatment if the corporation acquires a trade
or business and immediately liquidates it. Although this could be accom-
plished under Section 346(b) by acquiring, through a tax-free reorganiza-
tion, a business which had been actively conducted for five years, the result-
ing dilution of the shareholders' equity interest in the corporation prob-
ably would be sufficiently great to render the scheme unattractive as a
means of withdrawing earnings and profits from the corporation. Ap-
parently, the supposition behind the active-conduct rule is that a corpora-
tion would not acquire a business and operate it for five years unless there
were good business reasons for doing so.
It is at the point of the specific example of Section 346 that the greatest
correlation is found with the reorganization provisions." 3 Thus, in any
case under Section 346(b) where a partial liquidation could be effected
it would seem to be possible to continue the separate business as a different
corporation by the application of Section 355. Similar problems arise
in each case as to what constitutes a separate trade or business. The
primary distinctions between the two provisions result from the different
purpose of Section 355, which is to "limit [its] application . . . to those
cases in which the distribution of stock of the controlled corporation effects
only a readjustment of continuing interests in property under modified
corporate form." 114 Accordingly, Section 355 requires that both busi-
nesses be actively conducted following the division, 115 and it contains pro-
visions for adjusting the basis of stock and assets. The stock distributed
to the shareholder "l and the property distributed to the new corpora-
tion 1 both take a transferred basis. On the other hand, in the case of a
partial liquidation, the assets distributed to the shareholders would take
a new basis." 8 Of course, eventually the same result can be achieved un-
112. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.355-4(b) (3), 19 FED. REG. 8272 (1954). See
note 108 supra. A similar question is presented if a corporation having many different
retail outlets liquidates one of them. Cf. Rev. RUI. 270, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 35.
113. Compare INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §346(b), with id. §355(b)(2). See
Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, Tle Intermiw Revenue Code of 1954:
Corporate Distributions, OrganizationS, and Reorganization, 68 HA. L. REy. 393,
426-32 (1955).
114. Rev. Rul. 103, 1955 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9, at 7-8.
115. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §355(b) (1).
116. Id. §§ 358(a) (1),(c).
117. Id. §362(b).
118. Id. §334(a). A liquidation followed by a reincorporation in an effort to
obtain a stepped-up basis would probably be considered a reorganization. See note
103 mipra.
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der Section 355 as is reached under Section 346, since, at a future date,
one of the corporations can be liquidated and the assets distributed at capital
gains rates.
Two Businesses Not Held for -Five Years.-An example of a situation
where there are two businesses not operated for five years is L. M. Lock-
hart 119 in which a corporation organized by the taxpayer in 1939 conducted
oil drilling and production operations. Taxpayer was the sole shareholder,
and in 1943 he decided to separate the oil drilling from the production
operations of the business. Accordingly, the corporation redeemed stock
and distributed the assets connected with the production facilities, and the
taxpayer assumed the liabilities incident to these facilities. The Tax Court
held that the distribution was not equivalent to a dividend. The court
reasoned that the desirability of divorcing the production operations from
the liabilities connected with the drilling operations was a sufficiently valid
business purpose to -outweigh the evidence that the taxpayer was in need of
cash.
In this case the expiration of the five-year period was so close at hand
that it is possible that the taxpayer might wait before undertaking the
separation. However, if he wanted to split the corporation immediately, the
question arises as to whether the distribution would come within the divi-
dend equivalence test. Under the new Code, the period for which the dis-
tributed business had been operated would seem to assume great importance
to offset the possibility of distributing excess surplus at a favorable tax rate
by purchasing a business and liquidating it shortly thereafter. If the five-
year requirement of the specific test is considered to be a codification of a
business purpose rule, then, as other business reasons for making a dis-
tribution are shown to be stronger, the time element would seem to be
reduced concomitantly in importance. In determining whether a valid
business purpose exists, significant factors probably would be the reason
for commencing the operation of the separate business,' ° the success or
failure of the operation, and the basic reasons behind the decision to
liquidate.
General Business Contraction.-Corporation X was organized in 1893
to engage in the manufacture of paper products. In 1921 it was felt that
the capital stock of the corporation should be increased to keep it in line
with expanding business, since the gross sales and accounts receivables had
increased substantially. Therefore, a common stock dividend with respect
to common stock was issued, and the corporation transferred a correspond-
ing amount of surplus to its capital stock account. However, after 1930
the business decreased considerably because of changed economic condi-
tions, and in 1938 some of the principal shareholders discussed the pos-
119. 8 T.C. 436 (1947).
120. The situation here is not unlike that posed in cases of redemption of stock
previously issued as a dividend where the courts determined that if both the issuance
and subsequent redemption were for valid business reasons the transaction was not
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend. See text at note 122 and note
122 infra.
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sibility of liquidating the corporation. In 1941 it was decided that the
capital of the corporation was in excess of its needs and to that extent un-
profitable; therefore, pursuant to a plan, two-fifths of the stock of each
shareholder was redeemed for cash.
121
Decisions under the 1939 Code held that where a stock dividend and a
subsequent stock redemption were undertaken for valid business reasons
the distribution would qualify for capital gains treatment.'2 Under the
new Code the primary question is whether this case involves a contraction
which comes within the general dividend equivalence standard of Section
346.
The Senate Report states that this general test in Section 346 includes
situations "involving the contraction of a corporate business" 123 and cites
as an example the case of Joseph W. Imler124 The Imler case, as inter-
preted by the Senate, 25 involves an involuntary contraction of the cor-
poration's business resulting from a fire which destroyed the upper two
floors of a building owned by the corporation. Therefore, it is apparent
that in INler there was a dearly identifiable event which showed a definite
contraction of the business and which led to the reduction in the corpora-
tion's capital. The court said that under the circumstances this constituted
a valid business purpose for making the distribution. 2 6 If the significance
of the INler case is that there must be a valid business purpose for the
diminution of the corporate activities and the consequent reduction in
capital, it would seem that the hypothetical example would qualify under
Section 346. While there is no identifiable event in this situation such as
that in Imler, the corporation could show that there has been a decided
reduction in its sales and accounts receivable over the ten-year period prior
to the distribution, and under Section 346 this would seem to be a suffi-
ciently valid reason for redeeming part of its capital stock.127 This case
is essentially one in which the effect on the corporation's assets was from
an outside source, the changed economic conditions. A more difficult
problem is presented by the situation in which the contraction is basically
voluntary on the part of the corporation. The Senate Report states that
"[v]oluntary bona fide contraction of the corporate business may .
121. See Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BULL. 7.
122. See, e.g., Samuel A. Upham, supra note 121; John P. Elton, 47 B.T.A. 111
(1942), acq., 1942-2 Cu. BULL. 6; Henry B. Babson, 27 B.T.A. 859 (1933),
aff'd, 70 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 571 (1934). But cf. Dunton v.
Clauson, 67 F. Supp. 839 (D. Me. 1946).
123. See Sm. REP. 49, 262.
124. 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq., 1949-1 CGm. BUu.. 2. See SEN. REP. 49, 262.
125. The Imler case can be interpreted as a case involving the cessation of one
of two businesses. Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836, 840-41 (1948) acq., 1949-1 Cum.
BULL. 2. However, the Senate Report and the Proposed Regulations seem to consider
this case as a general business contraction, without reference to the two-business
element. See SEr. REP. 262; U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.346-1 (a), 19 FED.
REG. 8267 (1954).
126. Joseph W. Imler, supra note 125, at 841.
127. Cf. Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120, 1127-28 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BULL. 7.
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qualify to the same extent as under existing law," 128 but that a distribu-
tion from a "reserve for expansion is not a partial liquidation." 129 This
suggests that the Imler situation constitutes one extreme and a distribution
from a reserve for expansion the other, with bona fide voluntary contrac-
tions lying somewhere between the two? However, it is difficult to deter-
mine which situations fall within this middle area. Suppose a corporation
has been operating a department store, sells the store, and proceeds to open
a small shop specializing in ladies' apparel. If the new shop requires a
considerably smaller amount of capital to operate than did the department
store and the corporation redeems some of its stock, it would seem that the
distribution would come within the concept of a voluntary bona fide con-
traction under Section 346. On the other hand, if the operation of the
apparel shop necessitates only slightly less capital than was required by
the department store, a distribution of excess surplus which had been built
up prior to the sale of the old store probably would not qualify under
Section 346 since it would not have resulted from the contraction. 30
A transaction probably will have greater difficulty coming within Sec-
tion 346 as it approaches a distribution from a reserve for expansion.
Assume that a corporation has a substantial surplus, and, in contemplation
of expanding its business, reduces the surplus by issuing a stock dividend
to its shareholders and on its books transfers the amount from the surplus
account to the capital account. However, eight years later it becomes
apparent that the expansion program is no longer feasible because of
changed business conditions and new developments in other fields affecting
the corporation's sales. Consequently, the corporation disposes of the few
assets which it had acquired in connection with the program, and redeems
the stock which previously had been issued as a dividend.'3 ' Under the
prior law, it is possible that the transaction would have been treated within
Section 115(c) as a valid partial liquidation. 132  However, had there been
128. SEN. RaP. 49. The Report would seem to draw a distinction between
voluntary and involuntary contractions, since the phrase here quoted follows the dis-
cussion of the Inler case. However, compare the discussion on page 262 of the
Report: "It is intended that a genuine contraction of the corporate business as under
present law will result in partial liquidation. . . . However, a distribution of a
reserve for expansion is not a partial liquidation."
129. Id. at 262.
130. See Estate of Charles D. Chandler, 22 T.C. 1158 (1954). In this case the
fixtures and inventory of both the new and old stores were almost the same, and the
Tax Court viewed the excess cash which was distributed as not created by the
change in business activity but instead the distribution of what was previously an
unnecessarily large surplus. Id. at 1165. This treatment suggests the possibility that
a distribution which the court views as carrying along excess surplus would be
split, part qualifying under § 346 and the remainder having to qualify under
§ 302 or be subject to taxation under § 301. If the distribution is pro rata it would
probably not qualify under § 302 and hence would be subject to taxation under § 301.
See U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1.302-1, 19 FED. REG. 8239 (1954).
131. See T. Pierre Champion, 27 B.T.A. 1312 (1933), aff'd, 78 F.2d 513 (6th
Cir. 1935).
132. T. Pierre Champion, supra note 131; Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 571 (1934). But cf., E. M. Peet, 43 B.T.A. 852
(1941).
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no stock dividend, but instead an allocation of part of the surplus as a
reserve for expansion, the distribution would have been taxed as a divi-
dend under Section 1 15(g).'3 Although the hypothetical example is very
similar to'a distribution from a reserve for expansion, it is possible that,
if there is sufficient evidence ofz a valid business purpose, the courts, in
interpreting the new Code, might continue to apply those cases developed
under prior law which taxed the distribution as a capital transaction.
Investment of Surplus in Liquid Assets.-The X Corporation, which
manufactures men's suits, for a number of years has invested a substantial
percentage of its profits in various securities, instead of distributing them
to its shareholders. The corporation has collected distributions incident to
these securities and has purchased and sold them, as in the management
of any investment portfolio. Because it is unwilling to have this fund
subject to the risks of the manufacturing operation, the corporation, pur-
suant to a plan, redeems some of its outstanding shares and distributes to
its shareholders the securities, or the amounts realized from their sale.
134
This situation presents two questions under Section 346: first, whether
the investment activity, particularly if it was conducted for five years, can
be considered a separate business, and second, whether the distribution
resulted from a bona fide corporate contraction.
In its definition of a separate business, the House Bill specifically ex-
cluded a business whose gross income includes more than 10 percent of
personal holding company income.'15 According to the House Report, the
purpose of this provision was "to insure that the terminated business (and
at least one of the businesses remaining) be an operating business." 136
The Senate deleted this requirement, but it gave no indication of the reason
for doing so. An inference can be drawn that the intention was to permit
the distribution of an investment fund by a manufacturing corporation to
qualify under Section 346(b). On the other hand, it can be maintained
that the provision was omitted in order to accord with the Senate's policy
of providing greater flexibility and that other requirements of Section
346(b) may govern the situation. One reason why the Senate inserted the
requirement that the terminated and remaining businesses be "actively
conducted" 137 may have been to assert the same idea which the House
expressed by referring to "operating businesses," and for this reason it
can be argued that the type of situation being discussed here does not come
within Section 346(b). This contention finds support in the case of
Edward L. Kraus, Jr., Trust ' 3s which was decided under the 1939 Code.
In this case a corporation was engaged in the manufacture of slates and also
133. McGuire v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1936).
134. See Hyman v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
570 (1934) ; Edward L. Kraus, Jr., Trust, 6 T.C. 105 (1946).
135. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 336(a) (2) (C) (1954).
136. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A112 (1954).
137. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §346(b)(1),(2).
138. 6 T.C. 105 (1946).
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had invested a large amount of surplus in securities; the securities were
liquidated and the amounts realized were distributed to the shareholders.
The taxpayer argued that the corporation had conducted two businesses-
a slate business and an investment business-and that the termination of
the latter constituted a partial liquidation.13 9 The Tax Court concluded
that the securities represented the investment of accumulated profits and
that their liquidation merely served to return these profits to the corporation
rather than to liquidate a separate "business." 140
It also would seem that the reasoning of the Kraus decision would
weigh against the contention that the hypothetical situation qualifies as a
bona fide corporate contraction. In addition, this situation is similar to the
distribution of a reserve for expansion, since in both cases the shareholders
are receiving surplus which has never been dedicated to the manufacturing
operation. Moreover, ceasing to conduct the investment activity will
cause no reduction in the amount of capital needed to manufacture the
suits. In this respect, the hypothetical is similar to the one discussed above
in the "general contraction" section,' 4 ' and the conclusion reached there
was that the distribution would not qualify as a bona fide contraction.
This determination is substantiated further when Section 355 is con-
sidered. This provision is phrased in terms similar to Section 346 with
respect to active conduct of a trade or business,'4 and the Senate Report
clearly states that a separation of investment activities of a business from
its manufacturing operations does not qualify as a valid corporate divi-
sion.' 43 Because Sections 346 and 355 are closely related and because it is
desirable that the same result be reached regardless of which form the
transaction takes, the argument can be made that the hypothetical example
should not qualify under the former section.
It would seem that when amounts attributable to surplus are used to
purchase another operating business for a sound business reason they may,
at some later date, be distributed and taxed as capital gains or losses, but
when they are invested in liquid assets their subsequent distribution will be
taxed as ordinary income. This is a distinction of doubtful validity, since
its only justification may rest on a desire to allow the separate business
to be distributed in kind and operation continued on the partnership or sole
proprietorship level without the tax law being too strong a deterrent.
However, this justification breaks down because there is no requirement
that the separate business be distributed in kind; instead, it may be liqui-
dated and the amounts received distributed. rn this situation all that has
happened is that surplus funds previously invested in a separate business
have been changed into a readily distributable form, which does not seem to
be substantially different from the case where the surplus is invested in
139. Id. at 119-20.
140. Id. at 120-21.
141. See text at and preceding note 130 supra.
142. Compare INT. REv. Coos OF 1954, §355(b) (2) (A), with Id. §346(b) (1).
143. Ssix. REP. 51.
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liquid assets. Furthermore, even if the separate business is distributed in
kind and operated as a partnership or sole proprietorship, it can eventually
be disposed of and the individual can realize the amounts received as capital
gain or loss. Therefore the distinction which the Code seems to draw
between the investment of surplus in a separate business and in liquid assets
can be questioned.
Overlapping Distributions
Cancellation of Indebtedness.-Assume that A is the sole shareholder
of the X Corporation. A has maintained a drawing account with the cor-
poration, using the money withdrawn for his personal needs, and, at vari-
ous times, he has paid back some of the money or has credited his account
on the corporation's books with amounts owed to him as salary. How-
ever, a balance has accumulated in favor of the corporation. X Corpora-
tion is dependent on a great deal of credit in its operations, and, therefore,
it is essential that it maintain a high credit rating and obtain a low interest
rate. A change in business conditions has placed the corporation in a bad
financial position, and its regular sources of credit require that A's in-
debtedness be cancelled before they will take any more of its commercial
paper at a favorable rate of interest. As a result, A has the corporation
redeem some of his stock in return for the cancellation of the debt. 44
The distinction drawn in the cases decided under the 1939 Code
seems to be that, when there was strong pressure to cancel the indebted-
ness from a source outside the corporation, the redemption was not treated
as a dividend on the theory that there was a valid business purpose for
undertaking the transaction; lacking the outside pressure, there was an
insufficient business purpose and the opposite result was reached.145 Under
the 1954 Code this hypothetical case might fit within either Section 302
or Section 346 or it might fall outside the scope of both of these pro-
visions. Since A is the sole shareholder, the redemption of some of his
stock has no effect on the shareholder level because his equity interest in
Corporation X remains the same as before the distribution. However,
an argument can be made that a pro rata redemption such as this one will
come within the dividend equivalence standard of Section 302. The
144. See J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937); Isaac C. Eberly, P-H 1951 T.C.
Mem. Dec. [51351; A.C. Monk, P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. 47247; William W.
Wood, 3d, P-H 1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. 43488. Doubt has been expressed whether
reduction of a shareholder's indebtedness to the corporation by redeeming stock consti-
tutes an improvement in the corporation's financial position from the standpoint of
the creditors. See L. B. Hirsch, 42 B.T.A. 566, 571-72 (1940), aff'd, 124 F.2d 24
(9th Cir. 1941). However, it seems to be considered sufficient. See Isaac C.
Eberly, supra at pp. 1161-63.
145. See Bona Allen, Jr., 41 B.T.A. 206, 210-11 (1940). Compare Isaac C.
Eberly, supra note 144, with J. Natwick, supra note 144. In Ada Murphy McFarlane,
P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 154144, a distribution was held not equivalent to a
dividend because pressure from the taxpayer's son, a shareholder in the corporation,
to cancel indebtedness by a stock redemption was considered sufficient to show a
business purpose.
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Senate Report states that the test to be utilized in interpreting the dividend
equivalence test is in general the one employed under the old Section
115(g) and that in applying this test the inquiry is to be devoted solely
to the question of whether or not the transaction may be characterized as
a sale of stock by the shareholder to the corporation.14 Therefore, the
hypothetical example could come within the dividend equivalence stand-
ard of Section 302 by applying the rationale of the cases decided under
the prior law and by saying that the existence of a valid business pur-
pose means that there has been a "sale" to the corporation. The primary
difficulty with this approach is that it applies a factor which does not have
an effect on the shareholder level and thus would result in a broadening
of Section 302 which does not find substantial support in the Senate
Report 147 or the Proposed Regulations.
148
It is also questionable whether the distribution will come within the
scope of Section 346. Qualification for capital treatment depends on
whether the dividend equivalence test of this section encompasses some-
thing other than the concept of corporate contraction. The Senate Report
states that the definition of partial liquidation "would include" 149 and "in-
volves primarily, . . . the concept of 'corporate contraction' as developed
under existing law," 150 and this does not exclude the possibility of other
transactions coming within the dividend equivalence test.151 The equivocal
language of the Senate Report may result in the courts' applying the prior
case law that the existence of a valid business purpose means that the
distribution is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. On the other hand,
the derivation of Section 346 may encourage courts to limit it to corporate
contractions, since the antecedent provision of the House Bill was expressly
restricted to this type of situation.152 Although the Senate inserted the
dividend equivalence test in Section 346 in order to provide flexibility,
the intention may have been to restrict the application of this section to
corporate contractions and to permit elasticity only within this limited area.
One reason for not allowing this hypothetical example to qualify
under either Section 302 or Section 346 is that a distribution in a closely
analogous case would be treated as a dividend. Suppose that the X Cor-
poration redeems some of the stock of A, its sole shareholder, because A
146. SExi. REP. 234.
147. "Those distributions which may have capital-gain characteristics because
they are not made pro rata among the various shareholders would be subjected, at
the shareholder level, to the separate tests described in [Section 302] . .. .
Id. at 49.
148. U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. § 1-302-2(b), 19 FED. REG. 8239 (1954).
149. SEN. REp. 49 (italics added).
150. Id. at 262 (italics added).
151. This is true also of the Proposed Regulations. See U.S. Treas. Proposed
Reg. § 1.346-1(a), 19 Fa. R G. 8267 (1954).
152. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §336(a) (1954). H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954).
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needs a considerable sum of money to meet his personal expenses.15 3 Under
the 1939 Code the transaction was treated as a dividend because of the
absence of a valid business purpose, and the same result would be reached
under the 1954 Code. The only distinction between such a case and
the indebtedness cancellation situation is that in viewing the latter solely
at the time of redemption it can be said that the pressure of the creditors
provides a valid business purpose. However, there is essentially no
difference between these two situations; in each, the redemption was neces-
sitated by the fact that the shareholder received money from the corpora-
tion for his personal needs.
In order to provide uniform tax treatment, the result reached under
Section 346 should be the same as that reached if the transaction takes the
form of a reorganization. Assume that the X Corporation, for the same
reason as in the basic hypothetical example in this section, recapitalizes
by issuing new common stock and cancelling A's indebtedness in return
for A's old stock. The cancellation would be treated as "boot" and there-
fore subject to taxation under Section 356.154 The problem then would
be whether the transaction had "the effect of the distribution of a divi-
dend." 155 However, the resolution of this question is no more definite
than the one involved in interpreting the dividend equivalence test as con-
tained in Sections 302 and 346.:50
Acquisition of Stock for Resale to Employees.--Assume a case in
which the stock of the X Corporation is held by A and B, who are unre-
lated individuals. The corporation redeems some of its stock from the
two shareholders in equal amounts and resells it to certain key employees
in order to give them a proprietary interest in the business.
157
The basic question involved here is the same as that involved in the
case of indebtedness cancellation, namely, whether Section 302 includes
within its scope anything other than non-pro rata redemptions and whether
Section 346 encompasses anything other than corporate contractions.1 58
The primary difference with respect to Section 302 is that an argument
can be made that the employee case qualifies under the dividend equivalence
test on the basis that the interests of A and B have been changed, since
153. See Frenette v. Broderick, 5 CCH 1954 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (54-2
U.S.T.C.) 19458 (D.C. Kan. May 19, 1954); Raymond F. Koepke, P-H 1954
T.C. Mem. Dec. 54273, appeal filed, No. 46582, 6th Cir., Jan. 10, 1955.
154. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §356(a) (1).
155. Id. § 356(a) (2). See John L. Hawkinson, 23 T.C. No. 117 (Feb. 28, 1955);
R. D. Walker, 34 B.T.A. 983 (1936), acq., XV-2 Cum. BuLL. 25 (1936).
156. It may be possible that a distribution of "boot" is more likely to be treated
as having the effect of a dividend than is a distribution in redemption of stock because
of the influence of Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945). See
John L. Hawkinson, supra note 155. However the determination in each case should
be made in a manner similar to that undertaken in determining qualification within
the redemption provisions. See Wittenstein, Boot Distributiolu and Section
112(c)(2): A Re-Examination, 8 TAX L. REv. 63 (1952).
157. See Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949).
158. See text following note 145 supra.
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the resale to the employees dilutes the shareholders' equity interests in
the corporation. However, this differs from a non-pro rata redemption
in that here the interests change not by reason of the redemption but
because of the subsequent sale of stock. Nevertheless, this change of in-
terest coupled with the showing that the redemption was undertaken pri-
marily to benefit the corporation may be sufficient to bring this type of
case within the dividend equivalence standard of Section 302. If the divi-
dend equivalence test of Section 346 includes distributions other than
those involving corporate contractions, it may be easier for the taxpayer
to receive capital treatment in this case than in the cancellation of indebt-
edness situation. In the employee hypothetical the reason for the redemp-
tion, to have stock available for resale to key personnel, is to benefit the
corporation, while in the case of indebtedness cancellation the reason for
the original creation of the debt was solely to benefit the shareholder.
Redemption of Preferred Stock.I 9 -Suppose that the X Corporation
has authorized and issued 30 shares of voting common stock of which A
holds 20 shares and B and C, the other two shareholders, each own 5
shares. At one time, the corporation was in financial difficulties and it
became necessary for the three shareholders to lend money to the cor-
poration, which they did in equal amounts. However, other creditors
demanded that the claims of the shareholder-lenders be subordinate to their
claims, and thus preferred stock was issued instead of bonds or notes.'6 0
A, B and C each received 10 shares-of the preferred stock, which is non-
voting but is cumulative as to dividends and contains a provision for vot-
ing rights if default is made in the payment of dividends. After three years
the X Corporation's finances improve and it redeems 5 shares of the pre-
ferred stock from each of the-three shareholders.'
6 1
Under the 1939 Code this redemption probably would not have been
taxed as a dividend on the theory-that the transaction was similar to the
payment of a debt owed by the corporation to its shareholders. 1 2  Con-
sideration of this problem under the 1954 Code raises questions of whether
159. Problems relating to this aspect of the new law are also considered in
Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions, and Liquidations,
Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So. CALIF. TAX INsT. 349, 385-88.
160. See G. E. Nicholson, 17 T.C. 1399, 1407 (1952), acq., 1953-1 Cutrl. BULL.
5. If debentures would be issued subordinate to other creditors and the amount
of debentures was out of proportion to the capital stock, problems of "thin capitaliza-
tion" might result. See Fuchs, Thin Incorporatiots -Debt or Stock?, 5 Am. U. TAX
INsT. 141 (1953).
161. G. E. Nicholson, mpra note 160; Marjorie K. Hatch, P-H 1954 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 1154114.
162. See note 161 supra. Had the preferred stock been issued for cash at the
time of formation of the corporation and redeemed a few years later, the redemption
would have been treated as equivalent to a dividend under the 1939 Code on the
ground that the shareholders were using earnings and profits to recoup their -in-
vestment as soon as possible. Stein v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 446, 62 F. Supp.
568 (1945); Samuel L. Cantor, P-H 1953 T.C. Mem. Dec. 153182. But cf.
George A. Lembcke, 33 B.T.A. 700 (1935), nonacq., XV-I Cum. BULL. 37 (1936).
In Stanley Sagner, P-H 1953 T.C. Mem. Dec. f153378, a redemption of preferred
stock was allowed at capital gains rates shortly after formation of the corporation
because of a finding of corporate contraction.
THE DIVIDEND. EQUIVALENCE TEST
it will qualify for capital treatment and, if so, within which provision. If
only the preferred stock is considered, the redemption is pro rata and
each of the shareholders will have a difficult time in bringing the dis-
tribution to him within the dividend equivalence standard of Section 302.
However, if the preferred and common stock are considered together, an
argument can be made that the distributions to B and C should qualify
under this standard.1a Under this approach, there is a change of inter-
ests on the shareholder level, because before the redemption A owned 50
percent of all of the corporation's stock and B and C each owned 25 percent
while after the redemption A owns 55.5 percent and B and C each own
22.2 percent. The effect of this is that the preferred stock is now less
of an impediment on A's common stock. This will be expressed in the
future by the opportunity for a greater percentage of the corporate profits
coming to him through common stock dividends and also by the lessening
of the danger of losing control of the corporation through default on the
payment of dividends on the preferred stock. B's and C's interests in
the profits of the corporation will decrease concomitantly. Whether this
represents a sufficient change in interest to bring the distributions to B
and C within the dividend equivalence test of Section 302 cannot be ascer-
tained without the development of judicial and administrative interpreta-
tions. However, taking the approach suggested here, the distribution to A
should not qualify for capital treatment since the redemption has increased
his interest in the corporation.
In addition to this argument based on change of interest, it could be
maintained that the courts should apply the decisions under the 1939 Code,
which gave capital treatment to cases such as this because of their simi-
larity to the corporation's paying off a loan to its shareholders. The prob-
lem with using this approach under the dividend equivalence test of Sec-
tion 302 is that it is equally applicable to the redemption of A's stock and
thus tends to break down the shareholder-by-shareholder theory of this
section. Although this difficulty would be avoided if the prior cases were
applied in an attempt to bring the hypothetical within the dividend equiva-
lence test of Section 346, it would present the question of whether this
provision is to be expanded to cover a distribution which does not result
from the contraction of the corporation's assets.
An attempt by the corporation to reduce its preferred stock in the
hypothetical case would seem to meet similar problems if a recapitaliza-
163. Even if the preferred stock and common stock are considered together in
this case, the distribution cannot qualify under § 302(b) (2) relating to substantially
disproportionate redemptions. Under what circumstances a preferred stock redemp-
tion can qualify under this provision is a perplexing problem. While the Senate
Report makes a general statement that § 302(b) (2) will apply to the redemption
of preferred stock, SENx. REP. 234, the Proposed Regulations take the position that
a redemption of preferred stock will qualify only if the preferred stock is redeemed
simultaneously with a change of interest in common and voting stock which will
qualify within the percentage requirements of § 302(b) (2) (C). U.S. Treas. Pro-
posed Reg. §3.02-3(a), 19 Fun. REG. 8240 (1954). This problem is discussed in
Cohen, supra note 42, at 749.
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tion, rather than a redemption, were undertaken. If the corporation ex-
changed debentures and common stock for the old preferred and common
stock, the transaction would be affected by a new provision of the Code.
This section specifies that the receipt of securities in a reorganization, when
no securities are surrendered, shall not be considered a tax-free exchange,1
but instead is to be treated as "boot." 115 Treating the securities received
as "boot" 'll requires a consideration of whether their distribution has the
"effect of the distribution of a dividend," 117 and this question is no more
definite than the one involving the interpretation of the dividend equivalence
test.
Each of the three hypothetical problems which has been considered in
this section on overlapping distributions involves a situation which does not
fit clearly within either Section 302 or Section 346. The difficulty in giving
any of them capital treatment is that it would result in an extension of the
dividend equivalence test in one of these two sections beyond the scope
which the Senate Report indicates it is to have. However, when faced with
these problems, the courts may accord them capital treatment or they may
tax the distributions as dividends under Section 301 because they do not
fit precisely within the scheme of the Code. It cannot be predicted which of
these alternatives the courts will take, but it is clear that they must recognize
the difficulties which arise from the attempt of the new Code to separate
distributions in redemption of stock into two distinct categories.
CONCLUSION
The two poles in the area of corporate distributions are dividends and
complete liquidations. The former is defined to include only earnings and
profits of the corporation; the latter encompasses the corporation's capital
assets as well as its earnings and profits and is taxed at rates applicable to
capital transactions. The sections of the 1954 Code dealing with redemp-
tions of stock and partial liquidations attempt to draw a line between these
two extremes with respect to distributions in the "gray area." This delinea-
tion is accomplished by classifying transactions as qualifying for capital
treatment either because the equity interest of a shareholder in the cor-
poration in relation to the other shareholders has changed or because some
significant event has occurred on the corporate level, such as a genuine
164. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 354(a) (2) (B).
165. Id. §356(d) (1).
166. Although the Senate considered this new provision as reading into the Code
the case of Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947) (holding that receipt of
debentures and common stock for common stock in a recapitalization for which no
business purpose was shown was not a tax free exchange), see SEN. REP. 51, 269,
it seems that the Bazley case as interpreted has been expanded. Decisions under the
old Code interpreted Basley as not applying to an exchange of debentures for pre-
ferred stock under certain circumstances. See Penfield v. Davis, 105 F. Supp. 292
(N.D. Ala. 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1953); Daisy Seide, 18 T.C. 502
(1952). The new Code considers the receipt of the securities for preferred stock
as "boot" under all circumstances.
167. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §356(a) (2).
THE DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE TEST
contraction. The statutory method of setting forth this scheme is such that
it combines a series of specific examples and the general dividend equiv-
alence test drawn from the 1939 Code.
This statutory pattern represents a compromise between the rigidity of'
the House Bill and the indefiniteness of the old Code, but, unless the specific
examples are used merely to point the direction which the general test is to
take, it may create more problems than it solves. Furthermore, the efficacy
of the line drawn by the new Code and the characterization of transactions
depending upon the effect on the shareholder or the corporation are open
to serious question. The problems of interpretation, which revolve around
the vague dividend equivalence test and the overlapping of the two sections,
make it difficult to categorize any given situation. Because the new Code
lacks a precise standard and takes some of its language from the 1939 Code,
there is a strong possibility that prior cases will be given great weight in
future court decisions. Since these cases follow no definite pattern, such
an approach would result in the possibility of revenue loss for the Gov-
ernment through judicial sanction of tax avoidance plans, and, at the same
time, certainty and uniformity for taxpayers would remain a desired but un-
reached objective. In interpreting the new Code the courts should abandon
prior cases and direct their attention to the economic effect of a particular
distribution and to the desirability of having uniform tax treatment between
Sections 302 and 346 on the one hand and the reorganization provisions on
the other.
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